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THE SALE OF BUSINESS DOCTRINE:
JUDICIAL EXEMPTION FROM THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)' and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)
2 to regulate the purchase and sale of securities.
3
The '33 and '34 Acts define the term "security" to include any stock, bond,
note, debenture, investment contract, certificate of interest, or participation
in a profit-sharing agreement, or any instrument commonly known as a
"security." 4 Whether particular instruments are securities under the federal
securities laws, however, remains the subject of judicial debate.- Some courts
have exempted sales of a controlling interest in the ordinary corporate stock
of a business from the requirements of the '33 and '34 Acts.6 The sale of
1. The Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982).
2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982) (purpose of '34 Act to regulate exchanges and over-the-
counter markets when securities are traded on large scale); Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201
(7th Cir. 1982) (purpose of securities acts is investor protection). Courts that accept the sale of
business doctrine maintain that Congress enacted the securities laws to protect persons who transfer
their investments to third parties, not to protect persons who manage their investments themselves.
See 77 CoNo. Rac. 937 (1933) (President Roosevelt's proposal to Senate for federal regulation
of investment securities). In President Roosevelt's message to the Senate proposing federal regulation
of securities issues, Roosevelt argued for a return to a clearer understanding that persons who
handle or use other persons' money are trustees acting for others. Id.; see SEC v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (purpose of '33 Act is to protect investors); SEC v. International
Chem. Dev. Corp., 469 F.2d 20, 26 (10th Cir. 1972) (purpose of § 17(a) of '33 Act and SEC
rule lOb-5 is protection of investors); Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F. Supp. 1371,
1376 (W.D.N.Y. 1969) (purpose of § 12(2) of '33 Act is investor protection); see also S. RaP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934) (purpose of '34 Act is to prevent excessive use of credit
for speculation, unfair practices employed in speculation, and secrecy surrounding financial con-
dition of corporations which invite public to purchase securities); Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171 (1933) ('33 Act requires seller make full disclosure);
Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 42 YAE L.J. 227, 27 (1933) (same).
4. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (defining term "security") with 15 U.S.C. §
78(c)(a)(10) (1982) (defining term "security"). See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975) (definition of "security" in '34 Act substantially same as in '33 Act).
5. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (federally guaranteed and
insured bank certificate of deposit not security); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439
U.S. 551, 570 (1979) (noncontributory, compulsory pension plan not security); United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849-50 (1975) (shares in cooperative housing not
securities despite denomination as "stock"); cf. Tcherepin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-46 (1967)
(withdrawable capital share in savings and loan constitutes security); SEC v. United Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202, 212 (1967) ("Flexible Fund" annuities constituted securities); SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 66-73 (1959) (variable annuities constituted
securities); SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294, 301 (1946) (interests in citrus grove
constituted securities); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943) (interests
in oil and gas leases constituted securities).
6. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 199 (7th Cir. 1982) (sale of entire business to single
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business doctrine provides that the transfer of a controlling interest in the
stock of a corporation to a purchaser who intends to manage or direct the
management of the business does not constitute a sale of securities within the
meaning of the federal securities laws. 7 Courts accepting the sale of business
doctrine focus on the analysis of the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co. 8 In Howey, the Court considered the application of Section 2(1) of the
purchaser is not "security" transaction under federal securities laws even if accomplished by
sale of stock or other securities); King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 343 (l1th Cir. 1982) (sale of
100% of corporate stock to purchasers who intend to manage business is not security transaction
governed by federal securities laws); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 464-65 (7th
Cir. 1981) (recognizing Seventh Circuit's acceptance of sale of business doctrine in Fredriksen);
Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir.) (purchase of 100% of stock in marina
did not involve "security" within meaning of federal securities laws), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017
(1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 1977) (purchase of 100% of stock
of liquor store holding company as indicia of ownership of store, not "security transaction"
within meaning of securities acts); Kane v. Fischbach, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,608, at 92,988-89 (E.D.N.Y. March 31, 1982) (sale of company stock to controlling
partners of partnership which included seller was not transaction subject to federal securities
laws); Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1257, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (federal securities
laws inapplicable to stock transfer because purchaser intended to manage and operate business
without expectation of profits from efforts of others); Anchor-Darling Indus., Inc. v. Suozzo,
510 F. Supp. 659, 666 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (purchase of controlling stock of three closely held cor-
porations not "security transaction" as contemplated by federal securities laws)]; Zilker v. Klein,
510 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (purchase of all stock of corporation amounted to assump-
tion of control so that no securities involved for purpose of rule lOb-5).
7. See supra note 6 (cases sanctioning sale of business doctrine). A number of commen-
tators have discussed the sale of business doctrine. Compare Prentice & Roszkowski, The Sale
of Business Doctrine: New Relief From Securities Regulation or a New Haven for Welshers?,
44 O1Ho ST. L.J. 473, 520 (1983) (recommending rejection of sale of business doctrine based
on Supreme Court precedent, statutory construction, and policy grounds) and Comment, A Criticism
of the Sale of Business Doctrine, 71 CAMiI. L. REv. 474, 985 (1983) (arguing for rejection of
sale of business doctrine because '33 and '34 Acts specifically define security to include stock,
sale of business cases provide inadequate reasons for departing from definition's specific terms,
and application of doctrine would engender considerable administrative difficulties) [hereinafter
cited as Criticism] and Note, Repudiating the Sale-of-Business Doctrine, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1718,
1719, 1732 (1983) (arguing against acceptance of sale of business doctrine because doctrine con-
fuses definition of "investment contract" with definition of "stock" and thereby denies protec-
tion of '33 and '34 Acts to investors who need Acts' protection) [hereinafter cited as Repudiating]
with Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine: Toward a Transactional
Context-Based Analysis for Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. LAw 929, 975-76 (1984) (sale
of business doctrine supported theoretically and by Supreme Court precedent) and McAneny,
Acquisition of Businesses Through Purchases of Corporate Stock: An Argument For Exclusion
From Federal Securities Regulation, 8 FiA. ST. U. L. Rav. 295, 317 (1980) (arguing that invest-
ment contract formula should apply to exclude from federal regulation all transactions involving
stock transfer that is merely incidental to acquisition of business)] and Sedlin, When Stock is
Not a Security: The "Sale of Business Doctrine" Under the Federal Securities Laws, 37 Bus.
LAw 637, 680-81 (1982) (recommending acceptance of sale of business doctrine) and Thompson
The Shrinking Definition of a Security: Why Purchasing All of a Company's Stock is not a Federal
Security Transaction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 225, 236-52 (1982) (concluding that sale of 100% of
stock of business is not security transaction).
8. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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'33 Act 9 which defines "security" to include any "investment contract""0 to
an offering of units in a citrus grove combined with a service contract for
cultivating, marketing, and remitting the net proceeds to the investor." The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an action to restrain the
offeror from using the mails and instrumentalities of interstate commerce in
the offer and sale of unregistered and nonexempt securities in violation of
section 5(a) of the '33 Act.' 2 In determining whether the transaction was an
investment contract within the meaning of section 2(1), the Supreme Court
developed a three-part test." The Court defined an investment contract as
a contract, transaction or scheme in which a person invests money in a com-
mon enterprise with an expectation of profits solely from the efforts of another
party.' 4 Applying the test to the transactions in Howey, the Court found that
the investors provided capital and shared in the earnings and profits while
the promoters managed, controlled, and operated the enterprise." The Court
concluded that the transactions were investment contracts, and therefore the
promoters had violated the '33 Act by failing to register the securities.' 6
The Howey test brought a number of instruments not specifically listed
in the '33 and '34 Acts' definitions of a security under the term investment
contract.1 In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,' the Supreme
Court applied the Howey test to an instrument labelled "stock." 19 The Court
9. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982).
10. See id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (defining "in-
vestment contract" as investment in common venture with expectation of profits from others'
efforts).
11. 328 U.S. at 294.
12. Id. Section 5(a) of the '33 Act prohibits the use of the mails or any means or instruments
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce to sell securities unless the offeror
files a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e(a) (1982).
13. See 328 U.S. at 298-99 (development of Howey economic realities test).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 299-301. The Howey Court concluded that the land sales contracts, warranty
deeds and service contracts in issue were investment contracts because investors contributed money
and shared in the profits of an enterprise managed and partly owned by third parties. Id. at 299-300.
16. Id. at 300.
17. See Smith v. Gross, 604 F.2d 639, 642-43 (9th Cir. 1979) (animal breeding program
was investment contract subject to securities laws); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d
473, 484-86 (5th Cir. 1974) (pyramid cosmetics selling scheme was investment contract for pur-
poses of securities laws); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482-83 (9th Cir.) (self-
improvement courses were securities within meaning of federal securities laws), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 821 (1973); SEC v. Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 94,142, at 94,605 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (warehouse receipts constituted securities in
form of investment contracts); Riviera Operating Co., 1978 SEC. REaG. L. REP. (BNA) No. 449,
§ C, at 1 (SEC No-Action Letter Apr. 19, 1978) (memberships in recreational facilities were
securities).
18. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
19. Id. at 851-58. The "stock" considered in Forman amounted to a recoverable deposit
on an apartment. Id. at 842. The sole purpose of purchasing the shares of stock was to entitle
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in Forman decided whether common stock in a nonprofit cooperative housing
corporation constituted securities within the purview of the '33 and '34 Acts.2 0
The plaintiffs in Forman alleged violations of the antifraud provisions of the
'33 and '34 Acts2" in the sale of the stock.22 In Forman, prospective residents
of a state subsidized apartment complex bought shares of stock in the non-
profit housing corporation as a prerequisite to acquiring subsidized low cost
living space from the corporation. 3 Upon examining the transactions, the
Supreme Court concluded that the housing stock was not a security under
the federal securities laws. 24 The Court held that although the housing cor-
poration called the shares "stock," Congress intended the application of the
securities laws to depend on the economic realities underlying a transaction
and not on the name given to an instrument.2 Rejecting a literal approach
which regards any instrument termed "stock" as a security, the Court held
that the housing stock was in substance not a security for the purposes of
the federal securities laws because the housing stock did not possess any
characteristics traditionally associated with stock.26
the buyer to occupy an apartment in Co-op City, a low cost housing cooperative. Id. The housing
shares could not be transferred to a nontenant, could not be pledged or encumbered, and descended
only to a surviving spouse. Id. In addition, the shares did not entitle the holder to voting rights
in proportion to the number of shares purchased. Id. Each apartment had one vote irrespective
of the number of shares owned. Id. The housing cooperative required any tenant wishing to
terminate his occupancy to resell the stock to the corporation at cost. Id.
20. Id. at 842-43; see supra note 1 ('33 Act); supra note 2 ('34 Act).
21. 421 U.S. at 844-45. The plaintiffs inForman alleged that the defendants falsely represented
and failed to disclose several material facts in the housing cooperative's information bulletin.
Id. at 844. In Forman, the plaintiffs asserted claims under § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1982), and SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983).
22. 421 U.S. at 844-45.
23. Id. at 842-43. The residents in Forman acquired apartments in the housing cooperative
by purchasing 18 shares of stock in Riverbay Corporation (Riverbay) for each room in the apart-
ment. Id. at 842.
24. Id. at 847-58.
25. Id. at 849. The Forman Court held that courts should value substance over form when
defining the term "security." Id. at 848. The Court concluded that because securities transactions
are economic in character, whether a transaction is a security depends on the economic realities
of the transaction. Id. at 849. The Forman Court concluded that Congress intended the federal
securities laws to apply to transactions which are securities in fact, not only in name. Id.
26. Id. at 848-51. The Forman Court noted that every circuit court with the exception of
the Second Circuit had rejected a literal approach to the definition of a security. Id. at 849 n.14.
The Forman Court dismissed as dicta any support for a literal approach contained in SEC v.
C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). Id. at 849-50. In dictum, Joiner noted that
instruments may be included within the definition of a security as a matter of law, if the in-
struments answer to one of the terms listed in the statutory definition. See 320 U.S. at 351. The
Forman Court, however, concluded that the dicta in Joiner did not establish an inflexible rule
barring inquiry into the economic realities of a transaction. See 421 U.S. at 850. The Forman
Court found that the housing "stock" did not possess any attributes ordinarily associated with
stock. Id. at 851. For example, the shares were not negotiable, could not be pledged or hypothecated,
conferred no voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned, could not appreciate
in value, and did not provide the right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment
1144
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Addressing the issue of whether the housing stock constituted an invest-
ment contract under the '33 and '34 Acts, the Supreme Court again examined
the substance of the transaction by applying the Howey test. 27 The Forman
court stated that an investment contract was an investment in a common ven-
ture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits from the entrepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others.28 Because the plaintiffs' motivation in pur-
chasing housing stock was to acquire living quarters for personal use and not
to invest for profit, the stock did not constitute a security.2 9
The Forman decision limited the definition of a security by holding that
an instrument called "stock," a term specifically listed in the '33 and '34 Acts'
definition of a security, was not necessarily a security transaction." In Marine
Bank v. Weaver,3 the Supreme Court again held that another specifically listed
instrument, a bank certificate of deposit, was not necessarily a security.2 In
Weaver, the plaintiffs purchased a certificate of deposit from the Marine
Bank." The plaintiffs pledged the certificate of deposit to Marine Bank to
guarantee a loan to a company that owed money to the bank and was also
overdrawn on its checking account .3  In consideration for guaranteeing the
loan, the company promised the plaintiffs a share of the company's profits. 35
Although the plaintiffs requested that the company invest the new loan as
working capital, the company used the loan to pay overdue debts to the bank."
The company subsequently went bankrupt and the bank claimed the pledged
of profits. Id. The Forman Court determined that the purchasers bought the housing shares sole-
ly to acquire low cost housing and not for investment purposes. Id.
27. See 421 U.S. at 852. The Forman Court found no distinction between an "investment
contract" and an "instrument commonly known as a security." Id. The Court, therefore, con-
structed a single test for determining whether a transaction is a security. See id. The Court main-
mined that the Howey economic realities test for determining an investment contract embodies
the essential attributes running through all of the Supreme Court's decisions defining a security. Id.
28. Id. The Forman Court explained that the securities laws did not apply when the pur-
chaser desires to use or consume the item purchased. Id. at 852-53. The plaintiffs in Forman
purchased a place to live, and therefore the securities laws did not cover the "stock" transactions.
Id. at 853.
29. See id. at 853, 858 (securities laws do not apply when person purchases commodity
for personal consumption or living quarters for personal use).
30. See id. at 847-58.
31. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
32. See id. at 559.
33. Id. at 552.
34. Id. at 553. The plaintiffs in Weaver pledged a $50,000 certificate of deposit to Marine
Bank to guarantee a $65,000 loan made by the bank to Columbus Packing Company (Colum-
bus). Id. at 552-53. Columbus was a wholesale slaughterhouse and retail meat market which owed
Marine bank $33,000 for prior loans. Id. at 553.
35. Id. In Weaver, under the terms of the agreement with Columbus, the plaintiffs would
receive 50% of the company's net profits and $100 per month as long as the plaintiffs guaranteed
the $65,000 loan. Id.
36. Id. The plaintiffs in Weaver alleged that Marine Bank officers told the plaintiffs that
Columbus would use the $65,000 loan as working capital. Id. Instead, Columbus used the pro-
ceeds to pay overdue debt obligations to Marine Bank. Id.
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certificate of deposit. 37 Asserting that the certificate of deposit was a security
as defined by the '34 Act, the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that the bank
had violated the disclosure requirements of rule lOb-5 by misrepresenting the
intended use of the guaranteed loan and by failing to disclose the company's
poor financial condition.
38
Reasoning that the federal banking laws provide adequate protection to
persons who purchase certificates of deposit from federally regulated banks,
the Weaver Court held that issuers of bank certificates of deposit are not sub-
ject to liability under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 9
In arriving at the conclusion that a bank certificate of deposit is not a security
under the '33 and '34 Acts, the Weaver Court noted that an instrument which
falls within the broad sweep of the '34 Act is not a security if the context
otherwise requires.4" One can interpret the Weaver decision as removing a
specifically listed instrument from the literal definition of the securities laws
because the regulatory structure of the banking industry provided a context
that otherwise required exclusion of the bank certificate of deposit. 4' If the
Weaver decision demonstrates a desire to narrow the scope of the federal
securities laws, the Supreme Court's approach is consistent with the philosophy
underlying the sale of business doctrine.
42
Three circuits have adopted the sale of business doctrine, recognizing that
purchasers who acquire one hundred percent of a corporation's stock with
an intent to manage or direct the management of the business have not pur-
37. Id. at 553-54.
38. Id. at 554. The plaintiffs in Weaver alleged that the Marine Bank violated § 10(b) of
the '34 Act. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) (prohibiting use of manipulative or deceptive device
in connection with purchase or sale of any security). The plaintiffs also alleged violations of
the Pennsylvania Blue Sky laws and common law fraud. 455 U.S. at 554.
39. See 455 U.S. at 558-59. The Weaver Court held that the bank certificate of deposit
was not a se6urity because the reserve, reporting, and inspection requirements of the federal banking
laws protect the deposit. Id. at 558; accord International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 570 (1979) (noncontributory, compulsory pension plan not security because regulated by
ERISA).
In Weaver, the Court concluded that a bank certificate of deposit differed from other long-
term debt obligations. See 455 U.S. at 558. For example, a holder of an ordinary long-term debt
obligation assumes a risk of the borrower's insolvency but the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration guarantees a purchaser of a bank certificate of deposit payment in full. Id. The federal
banking laws provide holders of bank certificates of deposit with adequate protections. Id. at
559. Therefore, holders of bank certificates of deposit do not need the protection of the federal
securities laws. Id. A bank certificate of deposit is not a security because the comprehensive set
of regulations governing the banking industry provides a context which requires exclusion of
the instrument from the coverage of the '33 and '34 Acts. Id. at 558-59; see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l)
(1982) (instrument not security if "context" otherwise requires); id. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1982) (same).
40. See 455 U.S. at 558-59. 1
41. See id.; Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1982) (arguing that Weaver
departed from literal terms of statutory definition of "security" since certificate of deposit is
type of note); see also Criticism, supra note 7, at 984-85 (acknowledging Sutter's interpretation
of Weaver).
42. See Criticism, supra note 7, at 981 (Weaver consistent with sale of business doctrine
courts' narrowing scope of federal securities laws).
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chased a "security" under the federal securities laws.4 3 The Tenth Circuit
adopted the sale of business doctrine in Chandler v. Kew, Inc." In Chandler,
the plaintiff contracted for the purchase of a liquor store through acquisition
of one hundred percent of the outstanding stock . 4 The plaintiff contended
that because the contract was for "stock," the transaction came within the
protections of the '33 and '34 Acts. 46 Relying on the Supreme Court's For-
man analysis,47 the Tenth Circuit held that the economic realities of the plain-
tiffs purchase of one hundred percent of the stock of the liquor store was
not a security transaction under the federal securities laws because the pur-
chase was not an investment in which the plaintiff expected to earn a profit
solely from the efforts of others.4
8
The Seventh Circuit in Frederiksen v. Poloway 9 adopted the sale of
business doctrine in an action alleging failure to disclose and misrepresention
of certain material facts in connection with the purchase of a corporation
engaged in selling, servicing and storing boats." The parties to the agreement
structured the transaction as a sale of one hundred percent of the outstanding
shares in the corporation and agreed to the continued employment of the
previous owner as manager.5 ' The plaintiffs contended that the interests they
acquired in the sale were "securities" within the meaning of the federal
securities laws.- The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim on the ground
43. See, e.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 343, 346 (1lth Cir. 1982) (100% stock transfer
not security transactions under federal securities laws); Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147,
1154 (7th Cir.) (purchase of 100% of stock of business not security within meaning of securities
acts), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew, inc., 691 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir.
1977) (receipt of 100% of stock in liquor store holding company is indicia of store's ownership
not security transaction covered by federal securities laws).
44. 691 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1977).
45. Id. at 443.
46. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (defining "security" in '33 Act); id. § 78c(a)(10)
(1982) (defining "security" in '34 Act).
47. Id. at 443-44. The Chandler court stated that Forman held that Congress intended ap-
plication of the securities laws to depend on the economic realities underlying a transaction. Id.
at 444. The Chandler court held that Forman rejected any suggestion that a sale of stock is a
security transaction merely because the statutory definition of a security includes the words "any
... stock." Id. at 443; see 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (defining "security" in '33 Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(a)(10) (1982) (defining "security" in '34 Act).
48. See 691 F.2d at 444.
49. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
50. Id. at 1148.
51. Id. at 1148-49. The transactions in Frederiksen included an employment agreement be-
tween the plaintiffs and the former owner who would manage the corporation and receive a salary
and a 20% commission on sales. Id. The plaintiffs in Frederiksen sought to recover actual damages
and lost profits based on the defendant's alleged violation of the securities acts. Id. at 1149.
The plaintiffs also asserted pendent state claims for breach of the Illinois Blue Sky Laws, common-
law fraud, and breach of contract. Id.
52. Id. at 1149-50. On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the plaintiffs in Frederiksen argued
that because the literal wording of the federal securities laws included the term "stock", a legal
presumption existed that the plaintiffs' purchase of the defendant's stock was a security trans-
action. Id. at 1150.
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that the transaction did not involve a "security" under the '33 and '34 Acts. 3
In a two-step analysis, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling."'
Relying on Forman, the court noted in the first step of its analysis that the
congressional purpose of the federal securities laws was to protect investors."5
The Seventh Circuit recognized a dichotomy between commercial transactions
and investments as the key to defining the scope of the securities laws and
concluded that the securities laws do not apply to commercial transactions.56
Determining that Congress intended the securities laws to protect investors,
not entrepreneurs, the court in the second step of its analysis examined whether
the acquired interests constituted securities. 7 Again relying on Forman, the
Frederiksen court cited three factors against the plaintiffs' literal approach
to defining a security.58 First, the definition of "security" in the securities
acts is qualified by the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires."' , In
this sense, a transaction is not a security if the economic context of the trans-
action shows that the transaction is for commercial rather than investment
purposes. 0 Second, a statute may not govern conduct within the reach of the
statute if that conduct was not within the framer's intention." The Frederiksen
court implied that even though the federal securities laws list "stock" within
the detinition of a security, Congress may not have intended that all transac-
tions called "stock" be treated as securities. 62 Third, Forman rejected a literal
approach in favor of an economic realities test.63 The Frederiksen court deter-
mined that Forman and its progeny specifically rejected a literal approach
to defining a security."
4
53. Id. at 1149.
54. Id. at 1149-54.
55. Id. at 1150.
56. Id. The Frederiksen court compared transactions for investment purposes with trans-
actions motivated by a desire to use, consume, occupy or develop. Id.; see Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 615 F.2d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 1980) (bank certificates
of deposit were commercial transactions, not investments for profit); Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's
Inc., 543 F.2d 38, 41 (7th Cir. 1976) (note given as partial consideration for purchase of business
assets is not investment because no reliance on profit producing efforts of others). Relying on
the language in Forman that the securities laws do not apply when the purchaser's goal is to
use or consume the item purchased, the Frederiksen court held that such transactions are com-
mercial and therefore not covered by the securities acts. 637 F.2d at 1150.
57. See 637 F.2d at 1150-52.
58. Id. at 1150-51.
59. Id. at 1150; see 15 U.S.C. § 7Th(l) (1982) ("security" unless context otherwise requires);
id. § 78(c)(a)(10) (1982) (same). The Frederiksen court assumed that the prefatory clause "unless
the context otherwise requires" contained in the federal securities laws' definitions of a security
referred to the economic context of a transaction. See 637 F.2d at 1150. An instrument listed
within the statutory definition of a security is not a security if the surrounding facts show that
the instrument is an economic transaction different from a security. Id.
60. See supra note 59.
61. See 637 F.2d at 1150.
62. Id.; see Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (legislative
enactment may be within letter of statute but not actually within statute because not within spirit
of statute or not within intention of statute's makers).
63. See 637 F.2d at 1150-51.
64. Id.; see United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (reject-
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Abandoning the literal approach and applying the Howey economic reality
test to the transactions in Frederiksen, the court applied the sale of business
doctrine because the plaintiff did not expect to derive profits from the efforts
of others.6" The facts showed that the plaintiff controlled and operated the
business, and therefore the transaction failed the third prong of the Howey
economic reality test which requires reliance on the profit making efforts of
others. 66 The Frederiksen court concluded that the transaction did not come
within the scope of the federal securities laws. 67
Like the Tenth and Seventh Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the
sale of business doctrine in King v. Winkler.68 In Winkler, the court considered
whether a transaction involving a private sale of all of a sole stockholder's
shares to purchasers who intended to operate and manage the business per-
sonally constituted a security transaction under the federal securities laws. 69
Relying on Forman, the court rejected a literal test holding that the Howey
economic realities test was the appropriate standard to determine whether a
transaction involving the stock of a corporation was a security transaction.
70
Applying the Howey economic reality test to the facts in Winkler, the Eleventh
ing form of instrument in favor of substance of transaction in defining security); see also Tcherepin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (placing substance over form to define term "security" within
'33 and '34 Acts).
65. See 637 F.2d at 1152-53; Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc., 543 F.2d 38, 41 (7th Cir.
1976) (transaction is investment if investor relied on present and future profit producing efforts
of another).
Examining the requirement that an investor rely on the efforts of another to produce pro-
fits, the Fredriksen court cited with approval the Ninth Circuit's test in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enters. See 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). In Turner Enterprises,
the Ninth Circuit stated that the reliance requirement was satisfied if the efforts made by persons
other than the investor are essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of
the enterprise. Id.
66. See 637 F.2d at 1153; supra text accompanying note 14 (three part Howey economic
realities test).
67. Id. at 1154.
68. 673 F.2d 342 (1lth Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 343. The parties in Winkler structured the transaction so that the defendant sold
all stock in North Georgia Mechanical Company to the plaintiffs. Id. North Georgia Mechanical
then acquired the stock of the defendant's other corporation, North Georgia Mobile Homes Supply,
Inc. Id. The plaintiffs controlled the management and operation of both businesses and retained
the defendant as an employee for a period of time after closing the sale. Id.
70. Id. at 345. The Winkler court held that the Howey economic realities test was appropriate
to determine whether a corporate stock transaction was a "security transaction" or an "invest-
ment contract" within the definition of the '33 and '34 Acts. Id. As additional support for rejec-
ting a literal approach to defining a security, the Winkler court cited cases rejecting a literal
approach to defining a promissory note. Id.; see National Bank of Commerce v. All American
Assurance Co., 583 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1978) (commercial loan on promissory note, with
pledged securities as collateral is not security transaction); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d
84, 92-93 (5th Cir. 1975) (acknowledging dichotomy between commercial transactions and in-
vestments as key to whether note is security but failing to apply distinction to case); McClure
v. First National Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1974) (note and trust deed given by corpora-
tion to bank for loan were not securities), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1975); Bellah v. First National
Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1974) (note and deed of trust securing note not securities
within meaning of '34 Act).
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Circuit concluded that since the plaintiffs assumed the management and con-
trol of a business and expected no profit from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others, the transaction was not a security transaction.7 The Winkler
court held that in substance the purchasers bought and the sellers sold a
business, and therefore the sale of business doctrine was applicable.2
In contrast to the circuits adopting the doctrine, three circuits reject the
sale of business doctrine. 73 In Golden v. Garafalo,7' the Second Circuit strongly
repudiated the sale of business doctrine in favor of a literal approach to defining
a security.5 The plaintiffs in Golden purchased from the defendant one hun-
dred percent of the outstanding stock of a ticket brokerage business which
the plaintiffs intended to manage directly. 76 The plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dant violated the securities laws by misrepresenting the value of the business,
and therefore the value of the stock.1
7
The Golden court rejected the sale of business doctrine, holding that the
'33 and '34 Acts' definition of "security" included instruments that have the
71. See 673 F.2d at 344-45.
72. Id. at 346.
73. See, e.g., Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir. 1983) (sale of ordinary cor-
porate stock in business to buyer who plans to manage and control business subjects parties to
antifraud provisions of federal securities laws); Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 696 F.2d
227, 230 (2d Cir. 1982) (reaffirming Second Circuit's earlier rejection of sale of business doctrine
in Golden); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1140 (2d Cir. 1982) (conventional stock in business
corporations is security within meaning of '33 and '34 Acts whether or not underlying transaction
involved sale of business to one who intends to manage business); Coffin v. Polishing Mach.,
Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.) (purchaser of ordinary corporate stock was not denied pro-
tection of federal securities laws simply because purchaser intended to participate in management
of business), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Associates,
Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1263 (4th Cir.) (allowing application of antifraud provisions of securities
laws to depend upon percentage of shares involved in transaction would lead to "capricious"
results), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974). A number of commentators contend that the Third
Circuit rejected the sale of business doctrine in Glick v. Campagna. See 613 F.2d 31, 35 (3d
Cir. 1979); Repudiating, supra note 7, at 1724 n.40 (Third Circuit expressly rejected sale of business
doctrine in Glick v. Campagna); Prentice & Roszkowski, supra note 7, at 475 n.ll (Third Circuit
rejected sale of business doctrine); Seldin, supra note 7, at 641 n.9. (Third Circuit rejected sale
of business doctrine in Glick v. Campagna). A careful reading of Glick v. Campagna, however,
does not support the conclusion that the Third Circuit has rejected expressly the sale of business
doctrine. See Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 35 (3d Cir. 1979) (although the sale of 50% of
stock constituted sale of security, court did not reject expressly sale of business doctrine). Cur-
rently, the Third Circuit is considering whether to accept or reject the doctrine in a pending deci-
sion. See Ruefenacht v. O'Halloran, No. 83-5493 (3d Cir. filed Dec. 7, 1983). United States district
courts within the Third Circuit have both accepted and rejected the sale of business doctrine.
Compare Goodman v. De Azoulay, 554 F. Supp. 1029, 1032-33 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (accepting sale
of business doctrine because transaction failed Howey economic realities test) with Bronstein v.
Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925, 929 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (rejecting sale of business doctrine because bona
fide shares and capital stock of corporation are securities).
74. 678 F.2d 1139 (2d Cir. 1982).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1140. The parties in Golden structured the transfer as a sale of shares rather
than assets because the corporation held non-assignable leasehold rights to certain office space. Id.
77. Id.
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characteristics associated with ordinary stock."8 The Golden court disagreed
with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Forman that the Frederiksen deci-
sion presented."1 The Second Circuit maintained that Forman did not establish
the Howey economic realities test as the exclusive determinant of the status
of instruments as securities under the '33 and '34 Acts. 0 The Golden court
instead recognized the two part Forman analysis as the proper test of the
existence of a security."' The court noted that the first step of the Forman
test inquired whether the instruments were "stock" and examined the
characteristics commonly associated with stock including rights to dividends,
voting rights in proportion to shareholdings, ability to appreciate in value,
and transferability.' 2 The Golden court maintained that the Court in Forman
examined the instruments to determine if they represented an investment with
an expectation of profit from the efforts of others only after first determining
that the instruments were not conventional stock.83 The Golden court inter-
preted Forman to mean that if an instrument has the characteristics of ordinary
stock, the securities laws apply and a court should not apply the Howey
economic realities test.8' The Golden court held that conventional stock in
a business corporation is a security as defined by the federal securities laws
regardless of whether the underlying transaction involves the sale of a business
to a person who intends to manage it.' 5
78. Id. at 1144. The Golden court maintained that Congress would not have included the
specific term "stock" within the statutory definition of a security if Congress did not intend
to include all such instruments as commonly defined. Id. The court held that Congress included
catch-all phrases like "investment contract" to cover unique instruments not easily classified. Id.
79. Id. The Golden court held that since both Howey and Forman involved unique or idiosyn-
cratic instruments, any language in Forman suggesting that the Howey economic realities test
must be applied to all instruments to determine whether the instruments are securities was dicta. Id.
80. See supra note 79.
81. See 678 F.2d at 1144.
82. Id. The Golden court concluded that the first part of the "Forman test" seemed to
focus more on the legal status of the instrument rather than the economic realities underlying
the transaction. Id.
83. Id. The Golden court concluded that the Forman analysis was inconsistent with the
sale of business doctrine. Id. The court maintained that if the Howey economic realities test
determines whether an instrument is a security under the '33 and '34 Acts, then the Forman
Court did not need to first examine whether the shares were stock as defined by conventional
criteria. Id.
84. Id. In addition to rejecting the sale of business doctrine based on a contrary interpreta-
tion of Forman, the Golden court repudiated the doctrine on policy grounds. Id. at 1145.46.
The Second Circuit considered the sale of business doctrine too uncertain because the doctrine
would make unclear the scope of the securities laws. Id. Interpreting Supreme Court precedent
and examining policy considerations, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the sale of business
doctrine. Id. at 1144-46.
85. Id. at 1144. The lengthy dissent in Golden maintained that the majority extended federal
securities laws protections to plaintiffs who did not need federal protection. Id. at 1147. The
dissent concluded that the majority's expansion of the scope of the '33 and '34 Acts additionally
would burden the federal courts without furthering any congressional purpose. Id. In support
of the dissent's conclusion that the stock purchased by the plaintiffs was not a security under
the securities laws, the dissent maintained that the majority misconstrued the Supreme Court's
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The Fourth Circuit rejected the sale of business doctrine in Coffin v.
Polishing Machines, Inc. 6 In Coffin, the plaintiff purchased fifty percent of
the stock of a corporation and assumed duties as executive vice president of
the corporation. 7 The plaintiff sued in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that the defendant made materially
false and misleading representations in connection with the stock purchase."8
Dismissing the case on the pleadings,8 9 the district court maintained that under
the Howey economic realities test established in Forman, even ordinary cor-
porate stocks are not securities under the federal laws if the instruments do
not represent interests in an enterprise from which the investor seeks to gain
a profit solely from the efforts of others. 90 The district court held that the
Forman analysis. Id. at 1148. The dissent observed that the Forman Court applied a two part
test only in response to the alternate grounds for the Second Circuit's holding. Id.; see Forman
v. Community Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1250-55 (2d Cir. 1974) (share in non-profit housing
cooperative is both "stock" and "investment contract") The Golden dissent concluded that nothing
in the Forman decision suggested that courts must apply a two part analysis or that an initial
determination that an instrument possesses the common characteristics of corporate stock forecloses
an inquiry into the economic reality of the transaction. See 678 F.2d at 1148.
In addition to disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of Forman, the dissent main-
tained that Marine Bank v. Weaver supports the application of the sale of business doctrine.
See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982); 678 F.2d at 1148-49. The dissent stated
that Weaver denied the protections of the federal securities laws to the purchasers of a bank
certificate of deposit even though the instrument seemed to satisfy the statutory definition of
a security. Id. at 1149. In removing an instrument commonly known as a security from the statutory
definition of a security, the Weaver court relied on the definition's preceding "context" clause
to find that holders of bank certificates of deposit did not need the protection of the securities
laws. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982). The Golden dissent concluded
that the plaintiffs did not need the protections of the securities laws because the plaintiffs could
have inspected the business prior to purchase. 678 F.2d at 1149. The plaintiffs obtained specific
warranties and representations regarding the business' tangible and intangible assets. Id. In addi-
tion, the plaintiffs assumed full operational control of the business from the moment the plain-
tiffs signed the purchase agreement. Id.
Finally, the Golden dissent disagreed with the majority's conclusion that application of
the sale of business doctrine would lead to uncertain results. Id. The dissent noted that courts
accepting the sale of business doctrine have not experienced unusual difficulties in applying the
doctrine. Id.; see e.g., King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1982) (applying sale business
doctrine); Canfield v. Rapp & Son, 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981 (same); Frederiksen v. Poloway,
637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew, 691 F.2d
443 (10th Cir. 1977) (same). The Golden dissent dismissed the majority's additional fears that
the doctrine might interfere with business planning, noting that parties to a transaction may pro-
tect their interests by contract. 678 F.2d at 1149-50. The dissent concluded that the purchase
of 100% of the stock of a business that the buyer intends to manage is not a security transaction
within the securities laws and therefore the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1150.
86.596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
87. Id. at 1203.
88. Id. The plaintiff in Coffin sued to recover damages under the federal securities acts,
the Virginia Blue Sky statute, and common law fraud. Id.
89. Id. at 1204; see Fa. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (lack of subject matter jurisdiction); FaD.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state claim upon which relief can be granted).
90. See 596 F.2d at 1204; see also United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837, 848-58 (1975) (not every sale of stock within coverage of federal securities laws); SEC v.
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stock purchase was the sale of a half interest in a business and not an invest-
ment because the plaintiff was a substantial contributor to the management
of the corporation.9
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court, maintaining that Forman
did not deny a purchaser of ordinary corporate stock the protection of the
securities laws simply because the purchaser intends to manage the
corporation.92 The court adopted a literal approach to defining a security,
holding that when a transaction involves stock the securities laws apply.9 The
Coffin court interpreted Forman to require a two part analysis, 9 noting that
the Howey economic realities test should apply to the substance of a trans-
action only after determining that the instruments do not have the characteristics
commonly associated with stock.
95
In Daily v. Morgan," the Fifth Circuit joined the Second and Fourth Cir-
cuits in expressly rejecting the sale of business doctrine. 97 In Daily, the plain-
tiffs purchased all issued shares of the stock in a truck dealership and assumed
managerial control of the business after the sale.98 When the parties executed
the bill of sale, the plaintiffs obtained an audit of the business which pro-
mpted the plaintiffs to bring suit alleging that the defendants had given inac-
curate, incomplete, and misleading financial information about the business
at the time of the sale.99 The Daily court rejected the defendant's argument
that one who purchases an entire business with an intent to manage the business
does not need the protection of the federal securities laws simply because the
purchaser has an opportunity to inspect the business.' The court reasoned
W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (stock is security if stock represents interest in enter-
prise from which investor derives profit from others' efforts).
91. See 596 F.2d at 1204.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261
(4th Cir.) (strong presumption that securities laws apply when transaction involves stock), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
94. 596 F.2d at 1204.
95. Id. The Coffin court, however, rejected the sale of business doctrine in a case that
did not involve the purchase of a business. Id.; see Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1151
(7th Cir.) (Coffin involved sale of corporate stock to raise capital for profit-making purposes,
not sale of business). The court in Coffin stated that the defendant corporation sold stock to
finance corporate expansion. See 596 F.2d at 1204. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the
transaction in Coffin, the sale of securities to raise capital, epitomized the primary concern of
Congress in enacting the federal securities laws. Id.; see United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (federal securities laws concerned with sale of securities to
raise capital for profit-making purposes).
96. 701 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1983).
97. Id. at 497; see Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1140 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting sale
of business doctrine because "stock" is security); Coffi v. Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202,
1204 (4th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
98. See 701 F.2d at 497.
99. Id. The plaintiffs in Daily brought suit under SEC rule lob-5 and pendent state law
claims. Id.
100. Id. at 502-03. The Daily court contrasted the opportunity to inspect the business available
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that the reliance and materiality requirements of rule lOb-5 undermine the
argument.10 1 The court noted that if a plaintiff-purchaser had an opportunity
to inspect the business, the defendant-seller could argue that the plaintiff did
not rely upon the alleged misrepresentations or omissions or that the
misrepresentations or omissions were not material. 0 2
The Daily court also concluded that adoption of the sale of business doc-
trine would lead to a slippery slope regarding the scope of the '33 and '34
Acts because the percentage of stock necessary to exclude a purchaser from
the protections of the federal securities laws and the interpretation of the re-
quirement that profits come from the efforts of others make consistent ap-
plication of the doctrine a problem.103 The court also stated that a rule
depending on transfer of control would eliminate tender offers from securities
laws coverage. 4 On balance, the court concluded that adoption of the sale
of business doctrine would lead to marginal gain. 05 Additionally, the Daily
court rejected the argument that the sale of business doctrine would prevent
arbitrary application of the securities laws. 06 The Fifth Circuit noted that by
structuring the sale as a stock transfer, parties create an expectation that the
securities laws apply to the transaction. 10 7 The court also reasoned that adop-
tion of the doctrine would create its own arbitrary results. 00 For example,
a defrauded purchaser of fifty one percent of the stock of a corporation may
have no federal remedy, while a partner who purchases forty nine percent
of the stock has a remedy under the federal securities laws. 0 9 The Daily court
rejected the sale of business doctrine, concluding that policy agruments require
to an entrepreneur with a passive investor's lack of first hand knowledge about the business.
Id. at 502. The court noted that an investor must rely on information given by the seller. Id.
The court, however, rejected the distinction between entrepreneurs and investors as immaterial
to the need for protection of the securities laws. Id. at 502-03.
101. Id. To sustain a claim under rule lOb-5, a plaintiff must show a misstatement of material
fact, made with scienter, on which the plaintiff relied, that proximately caused the plaintiff's
injury. See Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981) (elements necessary
to prove § 10(b) claim have become black letter law), reversed in part on other grounds,
U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 683 (1983).
102. See 701 F.2d at 502-03.
103. See id. at 503. The Daily court maintained that adoption of the sale of business doc-
trine would not contribute to bringing the enforcement of SEC rule lob-5 into conformity with
Supreme Court precedent or congressional purpose. Id. The court in Daily inquired whether in-
siders or employees who purchase stock would have protection under the federal securities laws
if the requirement of the Howey economic realities test that profits come solely from the efforts
of others is given literal effect. Id.
104. Id.; see Karjala, Realigning Federal and State Roles in Securities Regulation Through
the Definition of a Security, 1982 U. Lx. L. F. 413, 423 (emphasis on control in sale of business
doctrine cases would exclude tender offer from coverage of federal securities laws).
105. 701 F.2d at 503.
106. Id. at 503-04.
107. Id. at 503; see United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850 (1975)
(use of traditional name such as "stocks" or "bonds" will lead buyer justifiably to assume that
securities acts apply).
108. See 701 F.2d at 503.
109. Id.; see McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 467-68 n.5 (7th Cir.) (instru-
ment may be security to some parties to transaction but not to other parties), cert. denied, 454
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the application of the securities laws to the sale of ordinary corporate stock
in a business to a buyer who plans to manage and control the business.110
The sale of business controversy extends beyond the issue of whether a
purchaser of one hundred percent of the stock of a corporation by a person
who intends to manage the business constitutes the sale of a security under
the federal securities laws.III In Sutter v. Groen,"2 the Seventh Circuit denied
the protection of the securities laws to a purchaser of less than one hundred
percent of the stock of a corporation."' In Sutter, the Seventh Circuit recon-
sidered the sale of business doctrine in light of the Second Circuit's rejection
of the doctrine in Golden v. Garafalo and the Supreme Court's decision in
Marine Bank v. Weaver.114 The Sutter court relied on the Weaver decision
in refuting the Golden court's literal interpretation of Forman.I" The Sutter
court reasoned that the bank certificate of deposit in Weaver was a type of
note which is one of the instruments specifically listed in the statutory defini-
tion of a security.' 6 The Sutter court determined that the Weaver opinion
removed one of the specifically listed instruments from the definition of a
security by interpreting the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires"
to mean the economic context of a transaction.
11 7
U.S. 835 (1981); infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text (discussion of McGrath).
The Daily court noted that under the sale of business doctrine if ten equal shareholders in
a business sold the stock to a single purchaser, the sellers would have a remedy under the securities
acts but the purchaser would not have a federal remedy. 701 F.2d at 50. The court acknowledged
special risks in the sale of a corporation. Id. at 504. For example, a person who purchases a
business is not liable for the business debt while one who purchases stock assumes the liabilities.
Id.; see H. HNN. LAw oF CoRomAToNs, § 341 n.30 (1970) (purchaser of shares indirectly assumes
corporation's liabilities). The court noted that liabilities often are disclosed inaccurately or in-
completely. 701 F.2d at 504.
110. 701 F.2d at 504.
111. See infra notes 114-34 and accompanying text (discussion of cases expanding sale of
business doctrine).
112. 687 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1982).
113. Id. at 203. In Sutter, the purchaser acquired 70% of the common stock of the corpora-
tion. Id.
114. Id. at 199. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Frederiksen and the sale of business doctrine
in Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1981). Id.; see also Marine
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (federally guaranteed and insured bank certificate
of deposit not security); Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1140 (2d Cir. 1982) (purchase of
100% of stock in ticket brokerage business is security despite purchaser's intent to manage business).
115. See 687 F.2d at 200-01.
116. Id. at 200.
117. Id. The Sutter court concluded that Weaver determined that the bank certificate of
deposit was not a security because the economic context surrounding the instrument did not re-
quire the protection of the securities laws. Id. The Sutter court maintained that Weaver narrowed
the scope of the federal securities laws by disregarding the literal meaning of "security" found
in § 3(a)(10) of the '34 Act. Id. at 200-01. According to Sutter, the Weaver court limited the
'33 and '34 Acts' protections because Congress never intended that the federal securities laws
be a cure for common law fraud. Id. Congress defmed "security" very broadly but presumably
only to prevent the financial community from evading regulation by inventing new types of financial
instruments. Id. at 201. Congress, however, did not define "security" in a manner to prevent
the courts from interpreting the '34 Act in light of the Act's purposes. Id.
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Rejecting the Golden court's literal approach to defining a security, the
Sutter court concluded that Congress intended to protect investors, not en-
trepreneurs, by enacting the federal securities laws."1 8 The Seventh Circuit in
Sutter emphasized the importance of distinguishing between an investor and
an entrepreneur in that an investor entrusts money to others expecting to pro-
fit from the efforts of others, 119 but an entrepreneur seeks profit primarily
through his own efforts. 2 ' Applying the distinction between investor and en-
trepreneur to the facts, the Sutter court concluded that the plaintiff was an
entrepreneur.' 2
The plaintiff in Sutter, however, acquired less than one hundred percent
of the stock in the corporation. 22 The Sutter court formulated a presumption
applicable in situations in which the purchaser bought a substantial percen-
tage of the stock of the corporation but less than one hundred percent.
123
The court held that ownership of more than fifty percent of the common stock
of a corporation leads to the presumption that the purpose in buying the stock
was for entrepreneurship rather than for investment.'24 The Sutter court stated
that a party can rebut the presumption of entrepreneurship by showing that
the purchaser's main purpose was investment. 25 By adopting a presumption
of entrepreneurship for purchases of less than one hundred percent but more
than fifty percent of the stock of a corporation, the Seventh Circuit greatly
expanded the scope of the sale of business doctrine.1
26
118. Id.; see President's Message to Congress, February 9, 1934 (President Roosevelt recom-
mending enactment of '34 Act for protection of investors); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
2, 5 (1934) (report of Senate Committee on Banking and Currency describing objective of legisla-
tion as protection of investors).
119. See WEBsmR's Tn Naw INamJATiorNA DxicoN~aY 1190 (1981) ("investor" is one
who seeks to commit funds for long-term profit with minimum risk).
120. See BLACK's LAw Dic oi aY 478 (5th ed. 1979) ("entrepreneur" is person who, on
his own, initiates and assumes financial risks of new enterprise and undertakes its management).
The Sutter court recognized a clear distinction between investors and entrepreneurs. See 687 F.2d
at 201. The court noted that while sometimes a person can be both an investor and an entrepreneur,
often the person is one or the other. Id.
121. See 687 F.2d at 201-03. Applying the dichotomy between investors and entrepreneurs
to the facts in Sutter, the Sutter court held that the sale of the defendants' stock to Happy Radio
was a transfer of 100% of the common stock to Bret Broadcasting. Id. at 202. Since the defen-
dants retained no role in the company, the transaction required the application of the sale of
business doctrine. Id. concerning the plaintiff's purchase of stock in Happy Radio, however,
the court inquired whether the plaintiff created Happy Radio as a corporate vehicle for acquiring
the assets of Bret Broadcasting or whether the plaintiff was just an investor in Happy Radio.
Id. at 202-03.
122. See supra note 113 (plaintiff in Sutter acquired only 70% of stock in Happy Radio).
123. See 687 F.2d at 203. The Sutter court formulated a presumption of entrepreneurship




126. See id. The Sutter court maintained that the greater than 50% entrepreneurial presumption
was consistent with the distinction between entrepreneurial and investment objectives in purchas-
ing stock. Id. The court reasoned that the dichotomy between entrepreneurs and investors was
fundamental to determining the intended reach of the '33 and '34 Acts and SEC rules. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit further refined the sale of business doctrine in McGrath
v. Zenith Radio Corp.27 In McGrath, the court considered whether the plain-
tiff's waiver of a stock purchase option and sale of shares in reliance on the
defendant's promise of future employment constituted a violation of the
securities laws. 28 Holding that the sale of plaintiff's shares gave the plaintiff
standing to assert a violation of the securities laws, the McGrath court noted
that the plaintiff was one of a number of employees who invested in and subse-
quently sold stock. 29 The shares represented investments by the individual
employees who held the shares and therefore constituted securities in the hands
of the plaintiff and other sellers. 30 The sellers' shares did not lose their status
as securities even though the purchaser bought all of the shares in the same
transaction.13' An instrument, therefore, may be a "security" to some parties
to a transaction but not to others.'
3
1
Courts accepting the sale of business doctrine rely on legislative history
of the securities laws and Supreme Court precedent to hold that the sale of
one hundred percent of, or a controlling interest in, a corporation's stock
with intent to manage the business is not a security transaction. 3 Although
127. 651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 835 (1981). The McGrath case concerned
the acquisition of an electronic products wholesaler by Zenith Radio Corporation (Zenith). Id.
at 461. The plaintiff, vice president and general manager of the acquired company, held an op-
tion to purchase up to five thousand shares of the company stock. Id. at 461-62. Since Zenith
wanted to acquire all of the target company's stock, Zenith requested the plaintiff to waive the
option to purchase additional shares. Id. at 462. The plaintiff purchased 2,835 shares of the
company's stock in September and October 1971. Id. Zenith's treasurer asked the plaintiff to
waive the option to purchase an additional 2,165 shares of the acquired company's stock. Id.
The plaintiff alleged that Zenith made oral representations to the plaintiff during the waiver negotia-
tions that Zenith would appoint the plaintiff as president of the acquired company upon the
retirement of the company's then current chief officer. Id. The plaintiff asked for a three year
employment contract with the acquired company, but Zenith's treasurer's declined to enter into
a contract, stating that Zenith's policy precluded employment contracts with Zenith executives.
Id. The plaintiff, therefore, accepted Zenith's oral statements that the plaintiff would be the
next president of the acquired company. Id. Zenith subsequently fired the plaintiff. Id. at 463.
128. Id. at 463-64.
129. Id. at 467-68 n.5.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. The McGrath court denied any indication that Frederiksen v. Poloway required
a result contrary to McGrath. Id. In McGrath, the shares constituted securities to the individual
sellers, but under Frederiksen would not constitute securities to the buyer. Id. But see Daily v.
Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 514 (5th Cir. 1983) (sale of business doctrine may lead to anomalous
and asymmetrical result that one party to transaction protected by federal securities laws while
other party not protected).
133. See supra note 7 (listing commentaries on sale of business doctrine). The traditional
formulation of the sale of business doctrine provides that a purchase of 100% of the stock of
a corporation with intent to manage the business is not a security transaction within the protec-
tion of the federal securities laws. See King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 346 (11th Cir. 1982) (private
sale of all of sole shareholder's corporate stock to purchasers who intend to operate and manage
business personally is not security transaction controlled by '33 or '34 Acts); Frederiksen v. Poloway,
637 F.2d 1147, 1150-54 (7th Cir.) (acquisition of 100% of stock in marina did not involve "security"
within meaning of '33 and '34 Acts), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew, Inc.,
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the '33 and '34 Acts specifically include the term "stock" in the definition
of a security."1 courts adopting the sale of business doctrine reject a literal
approach to the 'definition of a security.1 3 5 Rather, courts espousing the sale
of business doctrine favor an economic realities test which examines the trans-
action to determine whether the transaction is an investment in a common
venture with an expectation of profits from the efforts of others."'3 Courts
embracing the sale of business doctrine interpret the Forman decision to re-
quire the application of the Howey economic realities test to every transaction
to determine whether the federal securities laws control the transaction.
37
In contrast, courts rejecting the sale of business doctrine use a literal ap-
proach to determine whether an instrument is a security. 38 Ordinary stock
is a security because "stock" is a term specifically listed in the statutory defini-
tion of a security."19 Courts using the literal approach also rely on Forman,
but interpret the decision as requiring a two-step analysis to determine whether
an instrument is a security. 40 Initially, a court must examine the instrument
691 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 1977) (transaction in which plaintiff bought liquor store and as
indicia of ownership received 100% of stock of company owning store was not "security trans-
action" within purview of federal securities laws). Recently, however, a number of courts have
held that acquisition of a controlling interest of less than 100% of the stock of a corporation
with intent to manage the business is not a security transaction protected by the '33 and '34
Acts. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 1982) (acquisition of more than 50%0
of corporation's common stock leads to presumption that purchase was for commercial rather than
investment purposes); Oak Hill Cemetery of Hammond, Inc. v. Tri-State Bank, 513 F. Supp.
885, 890 (N.D. M1l. 1981) (purchase of control block of stock not security transaction even though
transaction involved less than 100% of outstanding shares).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1982) (term "stock" included within statutory definition of
security); id. § 78c(a)(10) (term "stock" specifically listed as instrument commonly known as
security).
135. See infra note 136.
136. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849-50 (1975) (rejec-
ting literal approach to definition of "security" in favor of Howey economic realities test); see
also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (developing three-part economic realities
test).
137. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text (discussion of Forman); supra notes 8-16
and accompanying text (discussion of Howey); see also supra note 6 (courts accepting sale of
business doctrine).
138. See supra note 7 (courts rejecting sale of business doctrine).
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (term "stock" included within statutory definition of
security); id. § 78c(a)(10) (term "stock" specifically listed as instrument commonly known as
security); see Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982) (term "stock" includes
instruments which have characteristics associated with ordinary conventional shares of stock).
140. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Brunelle, The
"Sale of Business" Controversy in the Definition of the Term "Security," 10 SEC. REo. L.J.
377, 381-84 (Golden's two-step analysis of Forman is workable approach to sale of business con-
troversy). Brunelle outlined five advantages to the two-step Forman analysis developed in Golden.
See id. at 381-82. First, the Golden Court's definitional approach obviates inquiries about whether
a purchaser acquired "control." Id. at 381. Second, the Golden court's analysis minimizes con-
fusion and risk in corporate planning. Id. Third, the Golden court's definitional criteria are
reasonable. Id. at 382. Fourth, the Golden court's definitional criteria are in accord with Forman
in that the criteria require that the instrument in question be stock in fact and not merely stock
in name. Id. Finally, the Golden criteria are objective. Id.
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to determine whether the instrument has the attributes commonly associated
with the named instrument.14' For example, if an instrument called stock
possesses the traditional attributes associated with stock, then the instrument
is a security and the court need not proceed to the next step of the analysis.'
42
If, however, the instrument does not possess the characteristics typically
associated with stock, the court may apply the Howey economic realities test
to determine whether the instrument is an investment contract. , 3 Courts re-
jecting the sale of business doctrine maintain that they need not resort to the
Howey economic realities test unless the named instrument fails the first step
of the Forman analysis.'"
In addition to rejecting a literal approach, courts accepting the sale of
business doctrine argue that the congressional purpose surrounding the '33
and '34 Acts is to protect investors, not entrepreneurs. 4 5 Further, Congress
drafted the '33 and '34 Acts to require full disclosure of material information
so that purchasers can make informed investment decisions. '" Courts accept-
ing the doctrine maintain that Congress enacted the securities laws to protect
investors in public markets but that entrepreneurs do not need the protection
of the federal securities laws since entrepreneurs can inspect any business they
might purchase and can demand material information from the seller.' 4
7
Courts repudiating the sale of business doctrine reject the dichotomy be-
tween investors and entrepreneurs.' 48 Courts which reject the doctrine main-
tain not only that "entrepreneurs" need the protection of the '33 and '34
Acts, but also that a difficult question arises in deciding whether a person
is an entrepreneur or an investor. 49 For example, a purchaser of a business
141. See Golden, 678 F.2d at 1144.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (setting out three-part in-
vestment contract test).
144. See 678 F.2d at 1144.
145. See supra note 3 (one purpose of '33 and '34 Acts is investor protection).
146. See supra note 3 (one purpose of federal securities laws is disclosure).
147. See Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982) (investors are only protected
class mentioned in securities laws' legislative history); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1982) (purpose
of '34 Act to protect investors in public exchanges); Fredriksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150
(7th Cir.) (entrepreneurs do not need protection of federal securities laws), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981). But see Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 502-03 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting argument
that person who purchases entire business with intent to manage business does not need protec-
tion of federal securities laws because purchaser has opportunity to inspect); cf. Golden v. Garafalo,
678 F.2d 1139, 1148 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (plaintiffs in position to inspect
business before purchase).
148. See 678 F.2d at 1146 (purchasers of business regard themselves as investors and
managers). In rejecting the dichotomy between an investor and an entrepreneur, the Golden court
noted that corporate control transfers often are motivated by a desire for capital gains resulting
from improved management. Id. The court concluded that classifying such transactions as exclusively
commercial constituted artificial classifications. Id.
149. See Daily v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1983) (basing application of federal
securities laws on "control" would lead to slippery slope); supra note 148 (recognizing problem
in classifying persons as investors or entrepreneurs).
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is also an investor in a corporation. 15° Furthermore, courts rejecting the doc-
trine contend that the size of the sale and the bargaining power or sophistica-
tion of the purchaser do not affect the coverage of the '33 and '34 Acts."'
Supreme Court cases defining a "security" sanction the sale of business
doctrine. 152 The Howey decision established the economic realities test as the
test of a security.' 5 3 Under the Howey economic realities test, an instrument
is a security if the transaction is an investment in a common enterprise with
an expectation of profits from the efforts of others.' Purchasers of a business
who intend to manage the business do not rely on others to make profits.' S
Therefore, a purchaser of a business does not need the protection of the federal
securities laws because the purchaser is not relinquishing control over his in-
vestment to a third party.'
5 6
In defining a security, the Supreme Court in Forman rejected a literal
approach, which specifies that any instrument labeled "stock" is a security,
in favor of the Howey economic realities test.' 5 The Forman Court explicitly
rejected any suggestion that a transaction in shares called "stock" is a security
merely because the '33 and '34 Acts' definition of a security includes the term
"stock."' 5' The Court held that the substance of a transaction rather than
150. See supra note 148 (Golden court acknowledged that persons who purchase corpora-
tion make investment in business); see also Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1982)
(person may be both investor and entrepreneur at same time).
151. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (application of securities laws does
not depend on position of parties).
152. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982) (bank certificate of
deposit not security because economic context of transaction requires otherwise); United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-52 (1975) (rejecting literal approach to defining
"security" in favor of economic realities test to determine whether transaction is security); SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (establishing three-part ecbnomic realities test
to determine whether transaction is security).
153. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text (discussion of Howey).
154. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (formulation of economic
realities test); see also United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-52 (1975)
(establishing Howey economic realities test as determinant of security transaction).
155. See Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir.) (if purchaser assumes "con-
trol" of critical decisions of corporation then transaction is not security), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1017 (1981); see also SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.) ("reliance"
requirement satisfied if persons other than investor make essential managerial decisions), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
156. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 244 (purchaser must lack control over intangible in-
vestment to invoke protection of federal securities laws); see also Tech Resources, Inc. v. Estate
of Hubbard, 246 Ga. 583, 585, 272 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1980) (lack of control over investment means
reliance on anyone other than purchaser for performance of managerial duties to produce profits).
157. See supra noes 18-30 and accompanying text (discussion of Fonnan); see also SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (economic realities test determines whether
transaction is "security" within '33 and '34 Acts).
158. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (explicitly
rejecting literal approach to defining security in favor of examination of substance of transac-
tion); see also Tcherepin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (substance considered over form
in defining "security").
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the form of an instrument involved determines whether the "stock" is a
security. 159 Whether an instrument is a security depends on the economic
realities of the underlying transaction because securities are economic in
character. 160 In addition, the Forman Court found no distinction between an
investment contract and an instrument commonly known as a security. 6' The
Court, therefore, concluded that the Howey economic realities test for deter-
mining an investment contract was the proper test of a security. 62
The Second Circuit and other courts taking a literal approach to defining
a security overemphasize the importance of the Forman decision's two part
structural analysis. 63 Courts taking a literal approach conclude that Forman
established a two part test to determine whether an instrument is a security
because the Forman Court first examined whether the "stock" in issue
possessed attributes commonly associated with stock.164 After determining that
the "stock" did not possess the ordinary characteristics of stock, the Forman
Court examined whether the "stock" was an investment contract under the
Howey economic realities test."5 The two part analysis of Forman, however,
did not establish two separate tests to determine whether an instrument is a
security. 66 The Forman Court's two part structural analysis merely reversed
in turn each of the lower court's alternative holdings that the "stock" was
159. See infra note 160 (substance of transaction rather than form of instrument constitutes
"security").
160. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 849 (1975) (Congress
intended application of federal securities laws to depend on economic realities of transaction
because securities are economic transactions).
161. See id. at 852. In Forman, the Court concluded that the basic test whether a transaction
is an "investment contract" or "an instrument commonly known as a security" was the Howey
economic realities test. Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) ("invest-
ment contract" is investment in common enterprise with expectation of profits from efforts of
others).
162. See 421 U.S. at 852. The Court in Forman stated that the Howey economic realities
test embodied the essential attributes that ran through all of the Supreme Court's decisions defin-
ing a security. Id. The Forman Court concluded that a security was an investment in a common
venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others. Id.
163. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1148 (1982) (Lumbard, J., dissenting) (Forman
Court applied two-part test only in response to alternate grounds for Second Circuit's holding);
see also Thompson, supra note 7, at 246. Thompson maintained that attempts by some courts
to read a separate test rationale into the structure of the Forman opinion constitutes an over-
reading of the Forman structure. Id. The Forman Court merely considered in turn each of the
lower court's alternative holdings and found neither persuasive. Id.; see Forman v. Commmunity
Services, Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1250-55 (2d Cir. 1974) (share in housing corporation is both "stock"
and "investment contract").
164. See infra note 165.
165. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (1982) (Forman applied two-part test
to determine whether instrument is "security" under '33 and '34 Acts); Coffin v. Polishing Mach.,
Inc., 596 F.2d 1202, 1204 (4th Cir.) (Forman two-part test determines whether instrument is security),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
166. See infra note 167.
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a security and that the shares were an investment contract under the Howey
economic realities test.
167
The Supreme Court in Weaver again rejected a literal approach to defin-
ing a security by denying the protections of the federal securities laws to a
federally insured bank certificate of deposit. 16 8 Examining the '33 and '34 Acts'
definition of a security, the Weaver Court stated that an instrument is not
a security if "the context otherwise requires.""'1 9 By interpreting the prefatory
"context" clause of the federal statutes' definition of a security to mean the
surrounding factual circumstances, the Weaver court found that the economic
context surrounding the purchase of a bank certificate of deposit removed
the instrument from the literal definition of a security.1
7
0
The legislative history of the federal securities laws provides support for
the sale of business doctrine.' 7' Congress enacted the '33 and '34 Acts to pro-
tect investors, not entrepreneurs. 72 Investors need the protections of the federal
securities laws to guarantee that public corporations provide individuals with
information necessary to make investment decisions.' Entrepreneurs, however,
do not need the protection of the federal securities laws because entrepreneurs
have access to information material to the purchase of a business.' 74 The sale
167. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848-58 (1975). The
Forman Court examined the economic realities underlying the housing "stock" transactions in
both parts of the Court's response to the lower court's alternative holdings. Id. When turning
to the Second Circuit's second alternative holding that the housing stock was an investment con-
tract, the Forman Court stated that ". .. we again must examine the substance-the economic
realities of the transaction-rather than the names that may have been employed by the parties."
Id. at 851-52 (emphasis added). The Forman Court's language reveals that the court applied the
Howey economic realities test to the housing stock in both parts of the Court's holding. Id.
168. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (bank certificate of deposit not
security); see also Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1982) (Weaver provides solid
support for sale of business doctrine); supra notes 112-26 and accompanying text (Sutter court's
conclusion that Weaver removed type of note from protection of federal securities laws).
169. See 455 U.S. at 558-59 (instrument not security if context requires otherwise); see also
Sutter v. Groen, 687 F.2d 197, 200 (7th Cir. 1982) (Weaver Court removed certificate of deposit
from protection of securities laws by relying on "context" clause prefacing federal securities laws'
definition of "security").
170. See 455 U.S. at 558-59 (bank certificate of deposit not security because regulatory structure
of banking industry provides economic context which excludes instrument from securities laws'
coverage).
171. See supra note 3 (outlining legislative history of '33 and '34 Acts).
172. See S. REP. No. 37, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933) (purpose of '33 Act to inform investor
of facts concerning securities for sale and to protect investor from fraud and misrepresentation);
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1934) (purpose of '34 Act to regulate operations
of exchanges dealing in securities and commodities for protection of investors).
173. See L. Loss, Sacuiur-s IREGuArioN 121-28, 2270-75 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969)
(examining philosophy of disclosure underlying enactment of federal securities laws).
174. Cf. Securities Act Release No. 5487 (Apr. 23, 1974). Under § 4(2) of the '33 Act, issuers
are exempt from registration if the offerors have access to the same kind of information that
registration would disclose. Id. If an offeree is in a position of economic bargaining power that
enables an offeree to obtain material information from the issuer, the issuer is exempt from registra-
tion under § 4(2). Id.; see also SEC v Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (applicability
of § 4(1) of '33 Act depends on whether particular class of persons affected need protection of Act).
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of business doctrine recognizes that individuals purchasing a controlling in-
terest in a corporation are entrepreneurs who, because of their bargaining posi-
tion, have an opportunity to inspect the business and therefore do not need
the protection of the '33 and '34 Acts.
175
Additionally, Congress enacted the '33 and '34 Acts to provide a federal
remedy when state remedies were inadequate. 176 Congress, however, did not
draft the federal securities laws to preempt state corporation laws or to
federalize common law fraud. "7 Entrepreneurs who purchase or sell a business




Adoption of the sale of business doctrine comports with the Supreme
Court's restriction on availability of federal remedies under the securities
laws. 79 Moreover, the sale of business doctrine may alleviate the burden on
175. See supra note 174 (sale of business doctrine exception analogized to § 4(2) registration
exemption).
176. See L. Loss, supra note 173, at 105-07, 2267-68 (examining inadequacies of state securities
laws which prompted federal regulation). The basic reason for the inadequacy of state securities
regulation is the interstate nature of business. Id. at 105. Another reason for the inadequacy
of state blue sky laws was ineffective enforcement by the states. Id. at 105-06. Finally, some
of the state acts are illusory. Id. at 106-07. For example, some state blue sky laws are limited
severely by exemptions. Id.; see also at 64-67 (listing common exemptions from some blue sky laws).
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1982) (§ 16 of '33 Act savings clause); id. § 78bb(a) (1982) (§
28(a) of '34 Act savings clause). Both the '33 Act and the '34 Act save all other rights and remedies
existing at law or in equity. See 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1982); id. § 78bb(a) (1982); see also L. Loss,
supra note 173, at 156 (state common law or statutory remedies are not affected by federal securities
laws).
178. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 241-44 (removing sale of business from purview of
federal securities laws returns parties to state court). Thompson argues that to invoke the protec-
tion of the securities laws, the purchaser must lack control over the intangible investment. Id.
at 244. In the sale of a business, however, the purchaser buys a tangible item for the purchaser's
own use or consumption. Id. Common-law fraud protects the purchaser of a tangible item for
use or consumption. Id.
179. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982) (bank certificate of deposit not
security); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695, 697 (1980) (scienter required in SEC injunctive ac-
tions under rule lob-5 and § 17(a)(1) of '33 Act); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230
(1980) (no duty to disclose nonpublic market information under rule 10b-5 absent relationship
of trust or confidence between parties to transaction); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (no implied private right of action under § 206 of Investment
Advisers Act); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979) (no implied private
right of action under § 17(a) of '34 Act); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 570 (1979) (federal securities laws not applicable to noncontributory, compulsory pension
plan); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1977) (violation of rule lOb-5 requires
proof of either deception or manipulation); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1977)
(defeated tender offeror lacks standing for damages under § 14(e) of Williams Act); TSC Indus.
v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (standard of materiality under § 14(a) of '34 Act);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-214 (1976) (scienter required in rule lob-5 damages
action); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 60-65 (1975) (traditional equitable prin-
ciples determine availability of injunctive relief under § 13(d) of '34 Act); Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749-55 (1975) (standing to assert private damages action
under rule lob-5 limited to purchasers or sellers); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837, 847 (1975) (housing cooperative shares of "stock" not securities under federal law).
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federal courts by withdrawing federal jurisdiction over such claims. 18 0
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must resolve the controversy surrounding the
sale of business doctrine to clarify the scope of protection afforded by the
federal securities laws.' 8'
BRucE MICHAEL HATRAK
180. See King v. Winkler, 673 F.2d 342, 343 (11th Cir. 1982) (action alleging violation of
federal securities laws dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Fredriksen v. Poloway,
637 F.2d 1147, 1154 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Chandler v. Kew,
Inc., 691 F.2d 443, 444 (10th Cir. 1977) (same).
181. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 514-15 n.8 (1974) (Court did not ex-
press any opinion on question of whether acquisition of three interrelated businesses involving
a stock transfer was security transaction within meaning of § 10(b) of '34 Act and SEC rule
lOb-5). In the Scherk decision, the Supreme Court noted that the petitioner did not assign error
nor did the petitioner brief or argue whether the purchase was a security transaction. Id. The
Supreme Court has declined to review decisions on both sides of the sale of business doctrine
issue. See, e.g., Fredriksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147, 1150-53 (7th Cir.) (accepting sale of business
doctrine), cert. denied 451 U.S. 1017 (1981); Coffin v. Polishing Mach., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202,
1204 (4th Cir.) (rejecting sale of business doctrine), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Occidental
Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Associates, Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1261-63 (4th Cir.) (rejecting sale
of business doctrine), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
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